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SUMMARY
The equalization system has long been considered a vital underpinning of the Canadian federation: a means to
create some purported fairness or justice among the provinces, by redistributing the wealth of provinces with
larger fiscal capacities to allow those with weaker fiscal capacities to provide roughly equivalent services to their
citizens. However, the mechanics of the equalization formula have long been suspected of being flawed. Since
grant-receiving provinces can adjust the way their fiscal capacities are calculated and reflected in the
equalization formula — by adjusting tax rates and spending, for instance — governments are confronted with
incentives to design their fiscal regimes in ways that maximize the size of the grants they receive, even if the
fiscal policies are designed for less-than-optimal economic efficiency. The incentive for grant-receiving
governments to “game” the formula, even unconsciously, is apparent; what has remained largely unresolved is
to what extent is it actually occurring.
This analysis shows that indeed it is occurring, and to a measurable degree. It finds that equalization grants
provide recipient provinces with incentive to raise their business and personal tax rates. This is because when a
government raises its own tax rate, it raises the national standard average tax rate, which is used in the
equalization allocation formula. That, in turn, raises the individual “have-not” province’s equalization-grant
entitlement. Exacerbating the problem is that the tax-raising provincial governments tend to underestimate the
deadweight cost that the tax hikes will have, potentially worsening the fiscal situation of a province that already
faces difficult economic challenges. 
This analysis also finds that the equalization-grant allocation system encourages spending among recipient
provinces, particularly on health-care services, resource conservation, industrial assistance, environment and
housing. Results show that for every $1.00 increase in equalization grants, recipient provinces further increase
spending by an additional $0.64 in total expenditure.
Neither effect necessarily furthers the equalization program’s idealistic intent. The promotion of higher tax rates
especially would seem to work at odds with the program’s conceptualization of a federal redistribution model.
By potentially further repelling business and taxpayers from “have-not” provinces, the result could be making
those provinces increasingly needy while continually reducing their citizens’ wealth.
The equalization formula is not unfixable. The arrangement can be made to work even better, in a way that
maintains the principle of redistributing wealth from more privileged provinces to less privileged ones, while
avoiding the perverse incentives that motivate “have-not” provinces to raise taxes. If equalization grants were
substituted with block grants that are unrelated to taxing capacity, taxes in grant-receiving provinces may
actually decline. A $100 per capita increase in block grants is potentially associated with an up to 2.6 percentage
points drop in business tax and an up to 0.26 percentage point drop in personal income tax. The result would
be an equalization arrangement that could help increase, rather than decrease, competitiveness in the very
“have-not” provinces that most urgently need to attract investment. Switching to block grants would not only
keep the integrity of the principles behind equalization in tact, it would actually make equalization work better
for all provinces.
† I would like to thank the anonymous referee, Bev Dahlby, Thiess Buettner, and Tracy Snoddon for their
valuable comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are my own.
INTRODUCTION
Equalization-grant systems have been the cornerstones of intergovernmental fiscal relationships
in federations such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and others. In the literature,
fiscal equity and efficiency have been put forward as major justifications for the presence of
such grants.1
In Canada, the equalization system was designed to address provincial fiscal disparities by
compensating recipient provinces when their per capita tax base is below the standard per capita
tax base. Theoretical analyses by both Smart and Dahlby2 show that in equalization programs
based on a representative tax system, such as the one used in Canada, equalization grants
influence recipient provinces’ tax policy incentives. The reason is that when a recipient province
raises its tax rate, it gets higher equalization entitlements by increasing the national standard tax
rate. Further, the province can receive higher equalization grants due to a reduction in the
province’s tax base associated with a rise in its tax rate. These tax-rate and tax-base effects of
equalization grants cause a downward bias of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) and, as a
result, the grant system gives recipient provinces an incentive to raise their tax rates. 
Previous empirical studies, such as those by Courchene and Beavis, Boessenkool, Esteller-Moré
and Solé-Ollé, Snoddon and Smart,3 also confirm that the equalization system influences tax
policy incentives in Canada. For other federations, Buettner4 finds that equalization grants
provide German municipalities an incentive to raise their tax rates. Dahlby and Warren, on the
other hand, find only weak evidence for Australian states.5
While the incentive effects of equalization grants on tax policy are well known and have been
widely examined in previous studies, there is a paucity of studies on its effects on government
spending. Since the Canadian equalization-grant formula compensates recipient provinces when
their per capita tax base is below the standard per capita tax base, Dahlby shows that this gives
the recipient provinces the incentive to under-provide tax-base-enhancing public services.6
1 See, for instance: R. Boadway and F. Flatters, “Efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of
government: a synthesis and extension of recent results,” Canadian Journal of Economics 15 (1982): 613–33; P.
Boothe and D. Hermanutz, “Simply Sharing: An Intergovernmental Equalization Scheme for Canada,” C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1999); M. Kőthenbűrger, “Tax competition and fiscal
equalization,” International Tax and Public Finance 9 (2002): 391–408; and R. Boadway, “The theory and practice of
equalization,” CESifo Economic Studies 50 (2004), 211–254.
2 M. Smart, “Taxation and deadweight loss in a system of intergovernmental transfers,” Canadian Journal of Economics
31 (1998): 189– 206; B. Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects of Fiscal Equalization Grants”, in Equalization: Welfare Trap
or Helping Hand?, ed. Paul Boothe (Halifax: Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2002). 
3 T. Courchene, and D. Beavis, “Federal-provincial tax equalization: an evaluation,” Canadian Journal of Economics 6
(1973): 483–502; K. Boessenkool, “Taxing Incentives: How Equalization Distorts Tax Policy in Recipient Provinces,”
AIMS Equalization Papers 3, ed. Brian Lee Crowley (Halifax: Atlantic Institute of Market Studies, 2002); A. Esteller-
Moré and A. Solé-Ollé, “An empirical analysis of vertical tax externalities: the case of personal income taxation in
Canada,” International Tax and Public Finance 9 (2002): 235–57; T. Snoddon, “On Equalization and Incentives: An
Empirical Assessment,” Discussion Paper (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University, 2003); and M. Smart, “Raising
taxes through equalization,” Canadian Journal of Economics 40 (2007): 1188–1212.
4 T. Buettner, “The Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalization Transfers on Tax Policy,” Journal of Public Economics 90
(2006): 477–497.
5 B. Dahlby and N. Warren, “The fiscal incentive effects of the Australian equalization system,” Economic Record 79
(2003): 434–445.
6 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects.”
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Cyrenne and Pandey offer the first empirical analysis on the effects of equalization grants on
the composition of Canadian provincial expenditure.7 They find that the share of unproductive
government expenditure is higher and the share of productive government expenditure is lower
in the recipient provinces compared to non-receiving provinces.8 Using data from German
municipalities, Hauptmeier also finds that equalization transfers have a significant negative
effect on local government’s share of productive expenditure.9
The main objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the incentive effects of
equalization grants on tax rates and government expenditure using panel data from Canadian
provinces over the period 1981-2008. Regarding the incentive effects of equalization grants on
tax policy, we focus on business and personal income tax rates, as these taxes account for a
significant part of provincial tax revenue and have been the topic of discussion in previous
studies. In addition, these revenue categories have been included in the equalization-grant
allocation formula throughout the period under consideration. In our empirical analysis,
following Buettner,10 we differentiate the income and incentive effects of equalization grants.
The incentive effects associated with the equalization system arise due to the equalization-rate
and -base effects that cause a downward bias of the MCF. In this paper we investigate this
issue by estimating both the equalization-rate and equalization-base effects, and controlling for
possible income effects associated with equalization grants. As the equalization-grant formula
shows a discontinuity in the relationship between equalization-grant entitlement and fiscal
capacity, we rely on this discontinuity to identify the effects of grants on tax rates. To the best
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to address this issue for Canada. 
Our empirical results suggest that equalization grants provide provincial governments an
incentive to raise their business and personal income tax rates. We also find that the incentive
effect works mainly through the equalization-base effects. These incentive effects of
equalization grants are clearly a form of distortion to provincial tax policy as the recipient
governments underestimate the true deadweight cost associated with the higher tax rates. Our
results suggest that if equalization grants were substituted with block grants that are not related
to taxing capacity, business and personal income tax rates would be lower in the grant-
receiving provinces.
We also investigate the effects of equalization grants on both the level and composition of
provincial expenditure using the discontinuity in the equalization-grant formula as an
identification strategy. Our empirical results suggest that equalization grants stimulate
provincial spending and affect the various provincial expenditure categories. Results from our
preferred regression indicate that a $1.00 increase in per capita equalization grant is associated
with $0.64 increase in per capita total provincial expenditure. This is broadly consistent with
7 P. Cyrenne and M. Pandey, “Fiscal equalization, government expenditure and endogenous growth,” Working Paper
(Winnipeg: University of Winnipeg, 2013).
8 Cyrenne and Pandey (ibid.) use three broad expenditure categories. They classify provincial expenditures on health,
education, transportation and communication, general government services, transfers to other governments, and
housing as “productive.” They also categorize provincial expenditures on social services and recreation and culture
as “unproductive.” Their third category, “others,” on the other hand, includes all the other remaining expenditures.
9 S. Hauptmeier, “The impact of fiscal equalization on local expenditure policies: theory and evidence from Germany”
ZEW Discussion Papers 07–081 (2007).
10 Buettner, “The Incentive Effect.”
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3the flypaper literature and the estimated results are well within the ranges of results obtained in
other similar studies. Further, our results indicate that equalization grants have a significant
positive effect on provincial spending on health-care services, resource conservation, industrial
assistance, environment, and housing. However, we do not find a significant effect on the other
expenditure categories. Overall, our results suggest that the Canadian equalization system
influences recipient provinces’ tax and spending decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of
theoretical and empirical studies of the effects of equalization grants on fiscal policy. An
empirical analysis of the effects of equalization grants on tax policy incentives for Canadian
provincial governments is presented and discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine how
equalization grants influence the level and composition of provincial governments’
expenditure. Section 5 concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Fiscal equity and efficiency have been put forward as major justifications for the presence of
equalization systems in federations.11 Regardless of the rationales for their existence, however,
there is a great potential for equalization systems to influence fiscal policy incentives. In this
section, we provide a brief review of the literature on the incentive effects of equalization
programs on tax policy and government spending.
The incentive effects of equalization grants on tax policy are in fact well known and have been
widely examined in previous studies. For instance, an earlier analysis of the Canadian
equalization system by Courchene and Beavis suggests that recipient provinces could
manipulate the equalization allocation formula to increase their equalization entitlements.12
The reason is that, in the Canadian equalization system, the main elements of the formula can
be affected by the tax policy choice of the recipient province. 
Smart presents the first theoretical analysis of the effects of equalization grants on tax policy
incentives using the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) framework.13 He shows that
representative-tax-system-based (RTS-based) equalization grants, such as the one used in
Canada, partially compensate for the deadweight loss associated with higher taxes and, as a
result, it gives recipient provinces the incentive to raise tax rates. Thus, subnational
governments may adopt suboptimal tax policies in order to gain more transfer payments from
the equalization system. This is because if tax-base elasticities are negative, as many empirical
studies show, provinces may have the incentive to raise tax rates, which will result in a
reduction in their fiscal capacities and more equalization transfers. 
11 See, for instance: Boadway and Flatters, “Efficiency and equalization”; Boothe and Hermanutz, “Simply Sharing”;
Kőthenbűrger, “Tax competition”; and Boadway, “The theory and practice.”
12 Courchene and Beavis, “Federal-provincial.”
13 Smart, “Taxation and deadweight.”
Dahlby also provides a comprehensive theoretical analysis of how equalization grants influence
both the tax and expenditure decisions of recipient governments.14 Regarding tax policy
incentive effects of equalization systems, his analysis indicates that equalization grants reduce
the perceived MCF of recipient governments and provides them an incentive to raise their tax
rates. He shows that there are multiple reasons for this. When a recipient government raises its
tax rate, the national standard tax rate increases and this provides the MCF of the recipient
government a downward bias. Further, an increase in the tax rate reduces the tax base of the
province and this also biases the MCF downward. The downward bias of the MCF caused by
the tax-rate and tax-base effects associated with equalization grants ultimately leads recipient
provinces to underestimate the true social cost of taxes. The implication of this is that the
equalization system provides recipient provinces an incentive to raise their tax rates.
While the above studies focus on the theoretical underpinning of the incentive effects of
equalization systems on tax policy, others investigate the issue empirically.15
One of the earliest attempts to gauge the tax incentive effects of equalization grants in Canada
is offered by Boessenkool.16 He investigates how the Canadian equalization-grant system
affects tax incentives by comparing the average effective tax rates of recipient provinces to
those of comparable non-recipient provinces. His analysis suggests that equalization-grant
receiving provinces generally levy higher tax rates than non-recipients. 
Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé empirically estimate the effects of equalization grants on Canadian
provincial personal income tax rates (PIT).17 Their dependent variable is average effective tax
rate, and they capture the effect of equalization grants by including the national standard average
effective tax rate for PIT (interacted with the equalization-receiving dummy variable) as an
explanatory variable. They also include the weighted average tax rate of contiguous neighbouring
provinces as a separate co-variate in their regression model. Their results suggest that
equalization grants have a significant positive effect on provincial personal income tax rates.
Over the years, the Canadian equalization system has passed through various policy changes.
One such policy change occurred in 1982, when the federal government adopted the five-
province standard instead of the 10-province standard that was in effect prior to that. Snoddon
exploits this policy change and provides an in-depth examination of the effects of equalization
grants on the growth rate of own-source revenue for Canadian provinces.18 She uses the change
in the number of standard provinces as the main identifying strategy to investigate the short-
run revenue effects of equalization grants. Her main objective is to examine whether the
equalization reform has an effect on own-source revenue growth in the years following the
equalization-grant reform. She estimates the effect of the equalization reform on own-source
revenue using dummy variables for the two years immediately following the reform. The 
14 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects.”
15 These studies include, for the Canadian federation: Boessenkool, “Taxing Incentives”; Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé,
“An empirical analysis”; Snoddon “On Equalization”; and Smart, “Raising taxes.” For Germany: C. Baretti, B.
Huber, K. Lichtblau, “A tax on tax revenue: the incentive effects of equalizing transfers: evidence from Germany,”
International Tax and Public Finance 9 (2002): 631–649; and Buettner, “The Incentive Effect.” And for Australia:
Dahlby and Warren, “The fiscal incentive.”
16 Boessenkool, “Taxing Incentives.”
17 Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé, “An empirical analysis.”
18 Snoddon, “On Equalization.”
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empirical analysis also employs various dummy variables to capture differential effects
associated with equalization-grant receiving provinces and those that are included or excluded
from the standard. The analysis is conducted for all provinces and for individual recipient
provinces separately. Her empirical results suggest that the reform has a positive effect on the
own-source revenue growth of those equalization-grant receiving provinces excluded from the
new standard. This is consistent with the general belief that the equalization system influences
tax policy incentives. The result, however, is negative for Quebec. 
Smart investigates the effects of equalization grants on tax policy, and how the presence of
such grants influence tax competition among Canadian provinces.19 His theoretical framework
provides two testable propositions: equalization grants increase the complementarity of
competitors’ tax rates; and, that an increase in the fraction of revenues equalized through the
grant allocation formula raises the tax rates of receiving provinces. Using annual Canadian
provincial data over the period 1972-2002, he tests the propositions of the theoretical model
empirically. In the empirical analysis, he measures the effect of equalization grants on tax
policy incentive by looking at the effect of the average effective tax rate of other provinces on
the effective tax rate of the province, and distinguishing the differential effects of grants
between receiving and non-receiving provinces. An increase in the average effective tax rate of
other provinces raises the national standard tax rate that is used in the equalization-grant
allocation formula. This in turn increases the equalization grant for receiving provinces. His
analysis makes use of this relationship to identify the effects of equalization grants on tax
policy incentives. His results indicate that equalization-grant recipient provinces respond more
positively to increases in other provinces’ average effective tax rates, suggesting that indeed the
equalization system influences tax policy incentives. 
Germany is one of the countries that have had a longstanding equalization-grant system.
Unlike Canadian provinces, however, German states do not levy their own taxes. Instead, the
federal government imposes the taxes and the states collect the tax revenue in their
jurisdictions. In this case, the amount of tax revenue collected in each state depends on the
enforcement efforts of the states. Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau examine the effects of
equalizing transfers on tax policy for German states.20 They look at how equalization transfers
affect states’ tax enforcement, which in turn affects the amount of tax revenue the recipient
governments collect. Their ordinary least squares estimation results show that equalizing grants
have a negative effect on a state’s tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. They interpret this as a negative
effect of equalization grants on tax-enforcement efforts of the states. However, their results
become insignificant when they use fixed-effects and other methods. So they find only weak
evidence that equalization grants affect tax revenue negatively.
Buettner investigates the effects of equalization transfers on business tax rates for
municipalities in a German state.21 The municipal fiscal equalization system in Germany takes
into account disparities in fiscal need and fiscal capacity. Buettner introduces a novel idea to
distinguish the income effect and the tax-incentive effect associated with the equalization
system. He shows that the equalization formula can be written as a difference of two basic
components: “virtual grants” and “marginal contribution rate” (times the tax base). The “virtual
grant” is the part of an equalization grant that does not depend on the tax base of the recipient  
19 Smart, “Raising taxes.”
20 Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau, “A tax on tax.”
21 Buettner, “The Incentive Effect.”
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jurisdiction and it shows the amount of grants that municipalities would receive if their tax
bases were zero. The “marginal contribution rate,” on the other hand, captures the fact that
when a local government’s tax base increases, in the equalization formula its fiscal capacity
rises and as a result it receives smaller grants. In the empirical analysis, he exploits the
discontinuity in the equalization-grant formula and uses policy changes to identify the effects
of equalization grants on business tax rates. The results indicate that while higher virtual grants
are associated with lower business tax rates, a higher marginal contribution rate provides the
local governments an incentive to raise their tax rates. Thus, his analysis provides empirical
support for the hypothesis that equalization grants influence tax policy incentives. 
As in Canada, the Australian equalization-grant allocation formula depends on the fiscal
capacity of the state relative to that of the standard fiscal capacity. Dahlby and Warren employ
the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) framework to analyze the incentive effects of the
Australian equalization system.22 They show that equalization grants can affect a state’s tax
policies through the “equalization-rate effect” and the “equalization-base effect.” When a state
raises its tax rate, the average standard tax rate used in the grant allocation formula increases.
This equalization-rate effect results in higher equalization grants for the state, provided that the
state’s relative fiscal capacity is low. The equalization-base effect, on the other hand, refers to
the increase in equalization grants that results from a reduction in a state’s tax base associated
with a rise in its tax rate. They derive a formula for the MCF, which depends on the standard
tax rate standard tax base, and the tax base of the state. They show that equalization-rate and –
base effects lead to a downward bias of the MCF and provide recipient provinces the incentive
to raise their tax rates. They then use data from Australian states to examine the tax-incentive
effects of equalization grants. They find somewhat weak empirical evidence that the
equalization system affects Australian states’ tax-rate choices.
While the tax-incentive problem associated with equalization grants is widely discussed in the
literature, there is a paucity of studies about the potential incentive effects of such grants on
government expenditures. In the literature, the effects of unconditional transfers such as
equalization grants on the recipient government’s total expenditure are often discussed in
conjunction with the flypaper effect — a common empirical finding that lump-sum grants increase
the recipient subnational government’s expenditure more than an equivalent increase in income. 
The majority of the flypaper-effect literature concludes that unconditional grants raise total
expenditure, providing indirect evidence that equalization grants may also affect total
expenditure.23 For the Canadian federation, Winer finds that grants raise provincial expenditure
by reducing the perceived cost of provincial public services.24 Similar positive effects of
unconditional grants on total expenditure are also obtained for other countries by Dahlberg et
al.25 for Sweden, and Lundqvist26 for Finland.
22 Dahlby and Warren, “The fiscal incentive.”
23 For a recent survey of the literature, see: S. Gamkhar and A. Shah, “The impact of intergovernmental transfers: a
synthesis of the conceptual and empirical literature,” in Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Principles and Practice
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007).
24 S. Winer, “Some evidence on the effect of the separation of spending and taxing decisions,” Journal of Political
Economy 91 (1983): 126–140.
25 M. Dahlberg et al., “Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending,”
Journal of Public Economics 92 (2008): 2320–2335.
26 H. Lundqvist, “Granting public or private consumption? Effects of grants on local public spending and income
taxes,” International Tax and Public Finance (2013), DOI 10.1007/s10797-013-9279-7.
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Of course, in addition to their potential effects on total expenditure, equalization grants may
influence the composition of government expenditure. In fact, previous studies such as
Dahlby,27 Hauptmeier,28 and Cyrenne and Pandey29 suggest that equalization grants influence
the composition of government spending. Dahlby investigates this issue using the concept of
MCF in the optimal public spending framework.30 He uses a simple productive-enhancing
public input in the production function. If the public input is labour-augmenting, Dahlby shows
that the recipient government will under-provide the public input. Thus, his analysis suggests
that equalization grants give recipient governments the incentive to spend relatively more on
consumptive expenditures and less on those public services and expenditure that enhance the
tax base of the government. The reason is that when governments spend more on tax-base-
enhancing expenditures such as education and infrastructure, the tax base of the province
increases and this reduces the amount of equalization grant that the province might receive.
This gives the province a disincentive to spend on such services. Spending on pure
consumptive services, on the other hand, will not have an adverse effect on the amount of the
equalization grant the province receives as tax bases are less likely to be affected by such
spending. 
Recently, using an endogenous growth model with optimal choice of government expenditure,
Cyrenne and Pandey analyze the effects of equalization grants on the composition of
government expenditure.31 They assume that the government provides productive public
spending that enters the production function and increases economic growth, ultimately raising
the fiscal capacity of the government. The government is also assumed to provide
unproductive, or consumptive public services, that enter the utility function. In this model
setup, they show that along the balanced-growth path, equalization-grant receiving provinces
choose a higher unproductive government-spending ratio than non-receiving provinces. They
then test the implications of their theoretical model using Canadian provincial panel data for
the period 1989-2009. In their empirical analysis, they first classify provincial expenditures as
being “productive” or “unproductive” and use the ratios of these expenditure groups to total
expenditure as their dependent variables. They capture the effect of equalization grants on
productive or unproductive expenditure ratios by including a dummy variable for equalization-
grant recipient provinces among the explanatory variables. Their empirical results show that,
while the coefficient of the equalization dummy variable is negative and significant in the
productive-expenditure ratio regression, the dummy variable is positive and significant in the
unproductive-expenditure ratio equation. They interpret these results as evidence that the share
of unproductive government expenditure is higher and the share of productive government
expenditure is lower in the recipient provinces compared to non-receiving provinces.
27 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects.”
28 Hauptmeier, “The impact of.”
29 Cyrenne and Pandey, “Fiscal equalization.”
30 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects.”
31 Cyrenne and Pandey, “Fiscal equalization.”
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For German municipalities, Hauptmeier investigates the effects of equalization transfers on
local governments’ expenditure policies.32 The author focuses on analyzing the effect of
equalization grants on the share of local productive spending (which includes spending on
schools and municipal roads). As in Buettner,33 he exploits the discontinuity in the German
municipal equalization formula and uses a regression discontinuity approach to identify the
effects of grants. He finds that equalization transfers have a significant negative effect on local
government’s share of productive expenditure. 
Overall, the various studies surveyed above suggest that equalization-grant systems affect fiscal
policy incentives in recipient subnational governments. In the next section, we explore these
issues empirically using Canadian provincial data to shed some light on how the equalization
system influences tax policy and government spending incentives.
EQUALIZATION GRANTS AND TAX POLICY
Theoretical framework
In this section, we discuss the theoretical framework that shows how equalization grants
influence tax policy incentives of recipient provinces. Let p represent the province and j denote
the tax category. Then, the per capita total revenue for provincial government p for tax
category j is given as:
Rpj =  τpj Bpj  +  gpj (1)
where Rpj is per capita revenue, τpj is the province’s tax rate for tax category j, Bpj is per capita
tax base for the tax category j, and gpj is per capita equalization entitlement of province p for
tax category j. Suppose τj denotes the national standard average tax rate for revenue source j
and Bj denotes the standard per capita tax base for revenue category j, then the per capita
equalization-grant entitlement related to the j tax source for province p is simply:
gpj  =  τj (Bj – Bpj)  (2a)
where: 
τj =  
∑p=1 τpj Bpj
is the national standard tax rate and gpj is the equalization-grant entitlement related 
to tax category j. 
32 Hauptmeier, “The impact of.”
33 Buettner, “The Incentive Effect.”
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∑p=1 Bpj10  
Note that in Equation (2a), the receiving provinces’ tax-rate choices can influence the national
standard tax rate, and hence, the amount of grant it receives. If the receiving province is also
part of the standard provinces, its tax base also affects the amount of grants that it receives
through the change in the standard tax base. So, the grant allocation formula can be influenced
by the tax policy choice of the receiving provinces. As our primary focus is to analyze the
effect of equalization grants on tax policy incentives, we decompose the equalization allocation
formula into two parts: the parts of the formula that can and cannot be influenced by the tax
policy of the recipient province. In order to do that, following Buettner,34 we rewrite the grant
allocation formula shown in Equation (2a) as:
gpj  =  ypj – νpj Bpj (2b)
where ypj denotes what Buettner termed as “virtual grants” and it is the amount of equalization
grant that province p would receive if its tax base j were actually zero. More specifically, the
virtual equalization grant for any tax category is calculated as ypj = τ–pj B–pj, where τ–pj is the
average effective tax rate of other provinces in the federation and B
–pj is the average per capita
tax base of standard provinces (excluding the province’s tax base if the province is part of the
standard). If the province is not part of the “standard” provinces, then B
–pj = Bpj. 
Unlike the case of Germany that Buettner examined,35 in the Canadian equalization-grant
system, νpj is not a fixed parameter. It depends on the national standard tax rate and the relative
fiscal capacity of the province — both of which can be influenced by the tax policy choice of
the recipient province. We obtain νpj using the expression 
νpj  = τ–pj (1 – Πs) – (τpj – τ–pj) ( Bj – 1), 
where Πs is the population share of a province p (that is included in the standard) from the
total population of all the standard provinces, and the other variables are as defined before. If a
province is not part of the standard provinces, Πs is equal to zero. As Smart explains,36 the
recipient provinces’ tax rates and bases affect the national standard tax rate and, as a result,
provincial tax policy choices can influence equalization-grant entitlements. For grant-receiving
provinces that are included in the standard, they can also influence equalization entitlements
through changes in the standard tax base. Thus, as we will see later, ν captures the effects of a
receiving province’s tax policy choice on the amount of equalization-grant entitlements. 
34 ibid.
35 ibid.
36 Smart, “Taxation and deadweight.”
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Bpj
In order to discuss the incentive effects of equalization grants on tax policy, we use the
marginal cost of public funds (MCF) framework. The MCF shows the cost to society when the
government raises $1.00 of tax revenue. In the absence of grants, the MCF for tax category j
can be calculated as:
MCFpj =              
Bpj
Bpj + τpj (dBpj ) (3)
where B is the tax base and τ is the tax rate. In the presence of federal equalization grants to
the provinces, using Equation (1), the MCF for the recipient provincial government is given as:
MCFpj =                                   
Bpj (4)
Bpj + [τpj  – νpj] dBpj – Bpj  [ dνpj  + dνpj  .  dBpj]
Equation (4) shows that the presence of equalization grants affect the MCF of the province,
and hence, influence the tax policy incentives of the recipient provinces. Note that if νpj was
based on a fixed parameter, as is the case in other federations such as Germany, Equation (4)
would be reduced to the MCF expression used in Buettner.37 However, in the Canadian
federation, as Smart38 and Dahlby39 discuss, the third expression in the denominator of
Equation (4) is non-zero and the effect of νpj on the MCF is not straightforward. To shed some
light on the incentive effects of equalization grants on provincial tax policy, we further simplify
the above equation. Using Equation (4) and the definitions of the various variables, following
Dahlby and Dahlby and Warren,40 we can rewrite the MCF equation as: 
MCFpj =                     
1                     
,
1 + τpj  dBpj + Θpj  + ψpj
(5)
where: 
Θpj =  ωp ( Bj – 1) and ψpj  =  – τj (1 – Πs) εpj.Bpj
ωp is the tax-base share of the province in the federation, εpj is the semi-elasticity of the tax
base with respect to its own tax rate, and the other variables are as defined previously. Note
that, as tax bases normally respond negatively to their own tax-rate changes (except of course
when the province is on the downward sloping side of the Laffer curve), εpj < 0 and, as a result,
ψpj > 0. When a province raises its tax rate, the tax base shrinks and this results in a fall in its
relative fiscal capacity. A fall in the province’s relative fiscal capacity in turn results in an 
37 Buettner, “The Incentive Effect.”
38 Smart, “Taxation and deadweight.”
39 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects.”
40 ibid.; Dahlby and Warren, “The fiscal incentive.”
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increase in its equalization-grant entitlement associated with the tax category. Thus, ψpj
captures the increase in the province’s equalization grant caused by the fall in its relative fiscal
capacity as its tax base falls (due to the increase in the tax rate). This is the equalization-base
effect that Dahlby, and Dahlby and Warren referred to.41 See also Smart for an earlier
discussion of this issue.42 Equation (5) shows that the equalization-base effect, ψpj, gives the
recipient province’s MCF a downward bias. Thus, this gives the recipient government an
incentive to raise its tax rate.
For any given revenue category, when a provincial government raises its tax rate, it raises the
national standard average tax rate used in the equalization allocation formula. This increases
the recipient government’s equalization-grant entitlement. Dahlby and Warren termed this as
the equalization-rate effect.43 This equalization-rate effect is denoted by Θpj in Equation (5).
For provinces that are relatively small and have negligible effects on the national standard tax
rate, Θ reduces to zero. For this reason, previous studies, such as Smart,44 ignore this effect
from their analysis. Note also that the effect of Θpj on the MCF depends on whether the per
capita tax base of the province is higher or lower than the standard per capita tax base for the
specific revenue category. If the province’s per capita tax base is less than the per capita tax
base of the standard provinces (as is normally the case for equalization-grant recipients), Θpj
will be positive, resulting in a downward bias of the recipient government’s MCF. This
provides the recipient government an incentive to raise its tax rate. 
Empirical specification and methodology
Based on the theoretical framework discussed above, our empirical analysis of the effects of
equalization grants on tax rates for revenue category j can be specified as:
τpj = f (ypj, ψpj, Θpj; Zp), (6)
where τpj is the tax rate, ypj is the virtual equalization grant associated with the tax category,
ψpj is the equalization-base effect, Θpj is the equalization-rate effect, and Zp denotes a vector of
other variables that can influence the tax-rate choices of a province. We are interested in
assessing the incentive effects of equalization grants on personal and business income tax rates.
These two revenue categories together account for a significant source of revenue for the
provincial governments and have been the focus of previous studies as well.45
41 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects”; Dahlby and Warren, “The fiscal incentive.”
42 Smart, “Taxation and deadweight.”
43 Dahlby and Warren, “The fiscal incentive.”
44 Smart, “Taxation and deadweight.”
45 For instance, for the last year of the period under consideration (fiscal year 2008/2009), these two tax categories
account for about 42 per cent of the total tax revenue for the 10 provinces.
The empirical specification can formally be expressed in the following form:
τpj,t = α0 +α1 ypj,t + α2 Θpj,t + α3 ψpj,t  + α4 D + 
α5 D.Θpj,t + α6 D.ψpj,t + α7 f (Ωpj,t) + α8 Zp + εpt (7)
where τpj,t is the average effective tax rate for tax category j in province p in year t, ψpj,t is the
equalization-base effect and Θpj,t is the equalization-rate effect. Previous studies, such as
Boadway and Hayashi, Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé, and Smart,46 also used average effective
tax rates as dependent variables. D is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the province is
a non-receiving province in the year, or zero otherwise. We control for this indicator variable as
our focus is on the incentive effects of grants on the recipient provinces’ tax policy. Z contains
all other relevant control variables. 
As we have indicated previously, the Canadian federal government provides equalization grants
using a formula that is based on the per capita fiscal capacity of the province and that of the
standard provinces. For any revenue category, a province with a fiscal capacity that is below
the standard fiscal capacity is entitled to receive equalization grants. Since the fiscal capacity
of the province is basically determined by its tax base, it is directly related to the tax policy of
the recipient government. This shows that the equalization-grant entitlements are endogenous.
A number of previous studies also argue that empirical analysis of the effects of grants on
fiscal outcomes should consider grants as endogenous. Previous studies such as Knight,
Buettner, and Dahlberg et al.47 explain in detail why grants in studies such as ours can be
endogenous. 
As the equalization-grant formula shows a discontinuity in the relationship between
equalization-grant entitlement and fiscal capacity, following Buettner,48 we rely on this
discontinuity to identify the effects of grants on tax rates. As we discussed before, both the
equalization-rate and equalization-base effects depend on the relative fiscal capacity of the
province. Since the relative fiscal capacity of the province — the ratio of the per capita tax
base of a province to the per capita tax base of standard provinces — can have a direct effect
on tax-rate choices, we need to control for this element of the equalization-grant formula to
identify the exogenous effects of our key variables of interest on tax policy. In order to achieve
this, we need to control for a smooth non-linear function of relative fiscal capacity related to
the tax category. In Equation (7), f(Ω) denotes this non-linear function of relative fiscal
capacity, Ω . In the empirical analysis, we use various smooth polynomial and spline forms of
relative fiscal capacity.
46 R. Boadway and M. Hayashi, “An Evaluation of the Stabilization Properties of Equalization in Canada,” Canadian
Public Policy 30 (2004): 91–109; Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé, “An empirical analysis”; Smart, “Raising taxes.”
47 B. Knight, “Endogenous federal grants and crowd-out of state government spending: Theory and evidence from the
federal highway aid program,” American Economic Review 92 (2002): 71–92; Buettner, “The Incentive Effect”;
Dahlberg et al., “Using a discontinuous.”
48 Buettner, “The Incentive Effect.”
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Our empirical analysis is based on panel data from all the 10 provinces. We use equalization
entitlements related to the two tax categories rather than actual equalization grants in our
analysis of tax policy incentives. During the period under consideration, Alberta and Ontario
did not receive any equalization grants. British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland
also did not receive equalization grants in some years. In order to capture the incentive effects
of equalization grants only for receiving provinces, we include, D, a dummy variable that is
equal to one if the province does not receive equalization grants. Then, we control for the
interaction terms between this dummy variable and the equalization-rate and -base effects. 
In the empirical specification of Equation (7), our key coefficients of interest are α2 and α3.
These coefficients capture the equalization-rate and -base effects for recipient provinces,
respectively. While the coefficient estimates shed light on the direction of the equalization
incentive effects on tax policy, the numerical magnitude of the coefficients do not have
straightforward interpretations. The theoretical model suggests that, for grant recipients, the
equalization-rate effect (Θpj,t) has a positive effect on tax rates provided that the province’s
fiscal capacity is lower than that of the standard provinces. Thus, we expect that α2 > 0. A
positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for α2 can be considered as evidence of
presence of the equalization-rate effect. As we have indicated previously, this effect is
important for large equalization-grant recipient provinces such as Quebec, but less so for
smaller Atlantic provinces. So, in the empirical analysis, the equalization-rate effect may be
strongly influenced by Quebec.49 We also anticipate the equalization-rate effect to be
particularly important for business income taxes as provinces generally tend to compete to
attract businesses to their jurisdictions. For non-receiving provinces, one can obtain the
equalization-rate effect as (α2 + α5). According to the simple theoretical framework, we also
expect that α3 > 0. That is, the equalization grant provides an incentive for a recipient province
to raise its tax rate through the equalization-base effect (ψpj,t). Unlike the equalization-rate
effect, the equalization-base effect is important for all receiving provinces. In addition, for all
provinces, the personal income tax base is larger than the business income tax base. As a result,
we anticipate the equalization-base effect to be stronger for personal income tax. 
As in Smart,50 we include the weighted-average (weighted by population) average effective tax
rate of other provinces as a control variable. This variable enters as a one-period lagged
variable, as tax competition literature suggests that normally governments need some time to
adjust their tax policies in response to the policy changes of their neighbours. We also control
for various economic, demographic and political variables that capture the expenditure needs
of the government. More specifically, as in Smart,51 we control for the share of the population
that is 65 years of age and above (“Old”), the share of the population that is below 20 years of
age (“Young”),  and the unemployment rate. We also include non-equalization grants as an
additional co-variate. 
49 We conduct a sensitivity analysis to check if the results are robust to the exclusion of Quebec from the analysis.
50 Smart, “Raising taxes.”
51 ibid.
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It is well known that a tax policy decision is often influenced by the political ideology of the
governing party. Left-leaning governments generally have a tendency to raise income tax rates.
Thus, we capture this ideological effect on tax policy by including a dummy variable that is
equal to one if the premier of the province belongs to the Liberal party or the New Democratic
Party (NDP), which are the centre-left political parties in Canada. The literature on elections
and fiscal policy indicate that governments may adjust their tax policy to improve their chances
of re-election. We control for this possibility by including a dummy variable that is equal to
one if there is an election in the following year in our set of control variables.
Data
In our empirical analysis, we use administrative data obtained from Finance Canada. The
administrative dataset includes raw data used to calculate equalization entitlements for each
province and revenue category. These data are used to compute the average effective business
income tax rate as the ratio of tax revenue to tax base. The average effective personal income tax
rate is also calculated as the ratio of the administrative personal income tax revenue data used in
the equalization allocation formula to provincial taxable income. The administrative data are also
used to calculate the national standard average tax rate as the sum of provincial revenue divided
by the sum of tax bases for business income tax. We also use the same dataset to compute per
capita tax base of standard provinces as the sum of the tax bases in the five-standard (or 10, as
the case may be) provinces by the sum of the population of the standard provinces.
The equalization-base-effect and the equalization-rate-effect variables require information on
the national standard average tax rate, the population share of the standard province (relative to
the total population of the standard provinces) and the own semi-elasticity estimates. For
business income tax, data on the national standard average tax rates are obtained from Finance
Canada as indicated above. For personal income tax, we compute the national standard average
tax rate using administrative personal income tax revenue data used in the equalization
allocation formula and provincial taxable income as the tax base. The data set on provincial
taxable income was obtained from various issues of Income Statistics (formerly Tax Statistics
on Individuals) published by the Canada Revenue Agency. The data for the various federal
grants to provincial governments and tax bases are obtained from the same dataset. Annual
provincial data on personal income, GDP deflator, population, unemployment rate, and the
number of new immigrants, comes from Statistics Canada database (CANSIM). The data on
governing political parties and elections are from the Canadian Parliamentary Guide. The own
semi-elasticity estimates are obtained from Dahlby and Ferede.52 Their preferred own semi-
elasticity estimates for the corporate income and personal income taxes were -3.671 and
-0.762, respectively. We use these estimated semi-elasticity values to compute the equalization-
base effects for business income and personal income taxes, respectively.53 The equalization-
rate-effect variable is also computed using the tax-base data obtained from Finance Canada.
Table 1a provides summary statistics for the various variables used in our tax-rate regressions.
52 B. Dahlby and E. Ferede, “The effects of tax rate changes on tax bases and the marginal cost of public funds for
provincial governments,” International Tax and Public Finance 19 (2012): 844–883.
53 Notice that since the own semi-elasticity estimates are constant (and the same for all provinces), they simply scale
the equalization-base effects. The underlying results would not change if one prefers not to use elasticity estimates as
in Dahlby and Warren, “The fiscal incentive.” 
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TABLE 1A: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN THE TAX-RATE REGRESSIONS, 1981-2008
Note: For lagged average effective tax rate of other provinces, the number of observations is 270; for all others 
it is 280.
Empirical results and discussions
In this section, we present the empirical analysis related to the effects of equalization grants on
business income and personal income tax policy incentives. While Table 2 presents the
regression results for business income tax, the corresponding results for personal income tax
are shown in Table 3. All regressions control for provincial fixed effects, province-specific time
trends and non-linear form of relative fiscal capacity, as indicated, but we do not report their
coefficient estimates for the sake of brevity. Note also that the result tables provide standard
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
15
Business Income Tax
Average effective business income tax rate (in %) 11.56 7.47 3.29 78.07
Per capita virtual grants 286.20 153.77 34.07 574.03
Equalization-rate effect (in %) -0.26 4.04 -21.75 7.56
Equalization-base effect (in %) 32.20 8.39 13.48 48.19
Relative fiscal capacity 0.81 0.49 0.10 3.81
Lagged average effective business income tax rate 
of other provinces (in %) 10.26 2.07 6.30 15.31
Personal Income Tax
Average effective personal income tax rate (in %) 8.72 1.80 5.60 16.24
Per capita virtual grants 1,212.30 429.12 393.02 2,343.77
Equalization-rate effect (in %) 0.09 1.64 -5.64 4.19
Equalization-base effect (in %) 6.23 1.34 2.99 9.08
Relative fiscal capacity 0.89 0.15 0.55 1.35
Lagged average effective personal income tax rate 
of other provinces (%) 9.17 1.41 6.93 12.68
Other Control Variables
Per capita non-equalization grants (other grants) 619.48 173.19 308.44 1,113.62
Share of population 65 years and above (Old) (in %) 12.16 1.82 7.15 15.38
Share of population below 20 years (Young) (in %) 28.04 3.37 21.47 40.31
Dummy variable for left-leaning provincial government (Left) 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Dummy variable for the election year (Election) 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Unemployment rate (in %) 10.01 3.81 3.40 20.20
Variables Mean  Standard Min. Max.
Deviation
TABLE 2: BUSINESS INCOME TAX REGRESSION, 1981-2008
Notes: Dependent variable is average effective business tax rate. All regressions include provincial fixed-effects and
province-specific time trends. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by 
*** for one per cent, ** for five per cent, and * for 10 per cent. 
a The coefficient is divided by 100.
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Virtual grant -0.0218 ** -0.0201 ** -0.0242 ** -0.0260 *** -0.0199 ** -0.0260 **
(0.00995) (0.00871) (0.00982) (0.00984) (0.00930) (0.0100)
Rate effect -0.248 -0.270 -0.461 -0.536 -0.236 -0.594
(0.362) (0.327) (0.451) (0.378) (0.442) (0.431)
Base effect 0.247 *** 0.216 *** 0.371 ** 0.381 ** 0.347 * 0.383 **
(0.0662) (0.0685) (0.178) (0.177) (0.180) (0.177)
Non-receiving (Non) -3.273 -9.394 ** -1.703 -8.597 * -0.957 -7.052
(4.844) (4.155) (5.938) (4.855) (6.248) (4.936)
Non-X rate effect -0.490 0.151 -0.415 0.532 -0.885 0.341
(0.297) (0.300) (0.466) (0.433) (0.636) (0.410)
Non-X base effect 0.173 * 0.317 *** 0.152 0.299 ** 0.148 0.280 **
(0.101) (0.120) (0.121) (0.124) (0.121) (0.117)
Other provinces’ tax rate -0.228 -0.406 -0.0801 -0.347
(0.421) (0.370) (0.471) (0.384)
Other grants a 0.00650 0.00486 0.00667 0.00564
(0.00587) (0.00473) (0.00610) (0.00521)
Old 1.334 1.681 1.331 1.630
(1.541) (1.555) (1.519) (1.581)
Young 1.299 2.321 * 0.795 2.161 *
(1.033) (1.211) (0.909) (1.220)
Left 0.218 0.326 0.239 0.324
(1.275) (1.242) (1.299) (1.261)
Election -0.345 -0.282 -0.308 -0.306
(1.022) (0.943) (1.082) (0.980)
Unemployment -0.404 -0.702 -0.250 -0.660
(0.413) (0.470) (0.377) (0.465)
Relative fiscal capacity quadratic cubic quadratic cubic linear- quadratic-
spline spline
No. of observations 280 280 270 270 270 270
Adjusted R-squared 0.376 0.427 0.388 0.462 0.353 0.434
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TABLE 3: PERSONAL INCOME TAX REGRESSION, 1981-2008
Notes: Dependent variable is average effective personal income tax rate. Provincial fixed-effects and province-specific
time trends are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are
indicated by *** for one per cent, ** for five per cent, and * for 10 per cent. 
a The coefficient is divided by 100.
We begin in column (1) of Tables 2 and 3 by estimating our basic regression model with an
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method. The dependent variables are average effective
tax rates and we control for a quadratic form of relative fiscal capacity. Our results show that,
as in Buettner,54 the virtual grant is negative and statistically significant. This shows that virtual
grants have a negative effect on tax rates. The reason is that virtual grants raise the financing
capacity of provincial governments and, as a result, enable them to finance any given amount
54 Buettner, “The Incentive Effect.”
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Virtual grant a -0.220 *** -0.221 *** -0.235 *** -0.257 *** -0.242 *** -0.251 ***
(0.0435) (0.0437) (0.0494) (0.0513) (0.0504) (0.0509)
Rate effect 0.985 *** 0.973 ** 1.125 *** 1.016 *** 1.089 *** 1.007 **
(0.376) (0.385) (0.374) (0.383) (0.372) (0.389)
Base effect 1.477 *** 1.479 *** 1.487 *** 1.530 *** 1.520 *** 1.526 ***
(0.112) (0.114) (0.112) (0.118) (0.110) (0.119)
Non-receiving (Non) 2.830 *** 2.835 *** 1.907 * 1.995 ** 1.978 ** 2.014 **
(1.016) (1.023) (0.988) (1.010) (0.995) (1.016)
Non-X rate effect -0.779 * -0.772 * -0.604 -0.539 -0.625 -0.524
(0.404) (0.406) (0.410) (0.413) (0.446) (0.414)
Non-X base effect -0.393 ** -0.393 ** -0.267 * -0.267 * -0.280 * -0.273 *
(0.161) (0.161) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.159)
Other provinces’ tax rate -0.0697 -0.0782 -0.0692 -0.0783
(0.0485) (0.0499) (0.0497) (0.0498)
Other grants a     -0.000921 ** -0.000892** -0.000811 *         0.000897 **
(0.000453) (0.000450) (0.000442) (0.000452)
Old 0.232 0.326 0.231 0.299
(0.195) (0.203) (0.199) (0.200)
Young 0.194 0.231 * 0.200 * 0.219 *
(0.120) (0.121) (0.119) (0.122)
Left 0.0583 0.0344 0.0240 0.0361
(0.113) (0.114) (0.111) (0.114)
Election -0.0406 -0.0417 -0.0419 -0.0424
(0.0904) (0.0911) (0.0911) (0.0912)
Unemployment -0.122 *** -0.129 *** -0.125 *** -0.128 ***
(0.0391) (0.0394) (0.0395) (0.0389)
Relative fiscal capacity quadratic cubic quadratic cubic linear- quadratic-
spline spline
No. of observations 280 280 270 270 270 270
Adjusted R-squared 0.859 0.859 0.863 0.864 0.862 0.863
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
of government spending at a lower tax rate. The virtual grant coefficient estimates show the
effects of equalization grants on tax rates if the grant system were actually not based on fiscal
capacity. If we consider a hypothetical situation where the equalization grants are substituted
with block grants that do not depend on recipient provinces’ fiscal capacity, a $100 per capita
increase in such grants is associated with a fall in business and personal income tax rates by
about 2.2 and 0.22 percentage points, respectively. 
The results in column (1) of tables 2 and 3 also show that, as expected, the equalization-base
effect is positive and statistically significant at a five per cent level or better for both regressions.
However, the equalization-rate effect is statistically significant only for personal income tax.
Thus, the results suggest that equalization grants provide an incentive for provinces to raise the
business income tax rate only through the equalization-base effect. For personal income tax, on
the other hand, our results indicate that equalization grants affect the tax policy incentives
through both equalization-base and -rate effects. The results suggest that a one percentage point
increase in the equalization-base effect is associated with a 0.25 and 1.5 percentage point increase
in the business and personal income tax rates, respectively. Similar results are also obtained in
column (2) when we control for a cubic form of relative fiscal capacity.
In column (3), we control for a quadratic form of relative fiscal capacity and include additional
co-variates to capture the effects of economic, demographic, and political factors that
potentially influence tax policy. Again, the equalization-base effect continues to be positive and
statistically significant for both business income and personal income taxes, while the
equalization-rate effect is statistically significant only in the latter.
In column (4), as in column (3), we include all the control variables and use a cubic form of
relative fiscal capacity. Based on adjusted R-squared, the regression with cubic specification
for fiscal capacity shows the best fit for the data. Our results indicate that in a hypothetical
scenario where the equalization grants are substituted with block grants, a $100 per capita
increase in such grants is associated with a fall in business and personal income tax rates by
about 2.6 and 0.26 percentage points, respectively.
The results also show that the equalization-base effect is again positive and statistically
significant at the five per cent level or better in both tax-rate regressions. However, the
equalization-rate effect is again not statistically significant for business income tax, but it is
statistically significant at five per cent level for personal income tax. Thus, the empirical
results indicate that, for business income tax, the effects of equalization grants on business-
income-tax policy incentive works through the tax-base effect. For personal income tax,
however, both the equalization-base and -rate effects seem to be important in influencing the
tax policy incentives.55 The regression results suggest that a one percentage point increase in
the equalization-base effect is associated with 0.38 percentage point increase in the business
income tax rate and a 1.5 percentage point increase in the personal income tax rate. Thus, our
results are consistent with the widely held view that the Canadian equalization system provides
the recipient provinces the incentive to raise their tax rates. 
55 Partly because of the federal government’s Quebec abatement program, personal income tax rates in Quebec are
generally higher than those of other provinces. Thus, one may wonder if the statistical significance of the equalization-
rate effect in only the personal income tax rate regressions is driven by Quebec. As the sensitivity analysis in the
following section reveals, the statistical significance of the equalization-rate effect disappears once we exclude
Quebec. Thus the equalization-rate effect in the personal income tax rate regression may indeed be driven by Quebec.
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So far, we rely on using polynomial specifications for relative fiscal capacity. However,
theoretically, other forms of smooth functional forms can also be employed. To check if our
main result that equalization grants affect tax policy incentives is robust to other forms of
specification, in columns (5) and (6), we control for linear-spline and quadratic-spline form of
relative fiscal capacity, respectively. The results are qualitatively similar to what we found
before, suggesting that the results are robust to the form of non-linear function of relative fiscal
capacity. In general, our results suggest that equalization grants provide recipient provincial
governments an incentive to raise their business income and personal income tax rates. Thus,
the results provide empirical support to the hypothesis that equalization grants provide an
incentive to recipient governments to raise tax rates. And we find that this incentive effect
works through the equalization-base effect for business income tax and through both
equalization-base and -rate effects for personal income tax. That is, when provincial
governments raise their income tax rates, their tax bases fall and this increases the amount of
equalization entitlements. Dahlby and Warren56 find similar results for Australia.
Robustness checks
We conduct a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our preferred regression results of
tables 2 and 3. The results are shown in Table 4 below.
TABLE 4: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Notes: Dependent variable is average effective tax rate. The robustness checks are conducted based on our preferred
regression results of column (4) of Tables 3 and 4 and we use the same set of control variables used in the
preferred regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** for one
per cent, ** for five per cent, and * for 10 per cent. Provincial fixed-effects, province-specific time trends and
all other control variables are included but not reported. 
56 Dahlby and Warren, “The fiscal incentive.”
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Virtual grants -0.0228 ** -0.0265 ** -0.0259 *** -0.00413 *** -0.00185 *** -0.00262 ***
(0.0102) (0.0104) (0.00989) (0.000682) (0.000474) (0.000531)
Rate effect -1.086 ** -0.212 -0.530 0.522 -0.258 1.011 ***
(0.501) (0.940) (0.383) (0.458) (0.550) (0.384)
Base effect 0.299 0.394 ** 0.379 ** 1.476 *** 1.335 *** 1.539 ***
(0.188) (0.188) (0.171) (0.118) (0.0761) (0.121)
No. of observations 250 243 270 250 243 270
Adjusted R-squared 0.494 0.433 0.460 0.878 0.810 0.864
Business Income Tax Personal Income Tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Five- Excluding Controlling Five- Excluding Controlling
province  Quebec for Tax province  Quebec for Tax
Standard Interactions Standard Interactions
During the period under consideration, the number of standard provinces change from 10
provinces to five provinces, and more recently, back to 10 provinces. To check if this change in
the number of standard provinces influences our results, we do the analysis only for the period
where the five-province standard was in place. As results in columns (1) and (4), our results are
robust to the change in the number of standard provinces. 
As compared to other provinces, Quebec has various unique fiscal features. For example, it is
the only province that receives the federal tax abatement. It is also the largest of all the
equalization-grant recipient provinces, and as such, we expect the equalization-rate effect to be
stronger and more relevant for the province. In columns (2) and (5), we exclude Quebec from
our analysis. The results show that, while the virtual grants and the equalization-base effects
continue to be statistically significant with their respective expected signs, the equalization-rate
effect is now insignificant in the personal income tax-rate regression.This suggests that the
statistical significance of the equalization-rate effect in the personal income tax regression that
we find in the previous section is driven by Quebec.
As previous studies indicate, business and personal income tax rates are related in many ways
and may influence each other. Thus, one may suspect that personal income tax rate may influence
the incentive effects of business income tax rate and vice versa. To capture this, we include the
personal income tax rate and the business income tax rate as additional control variables in
columns (3) and (6), respectively. Again, our results are robust to this sensitivity check.
In sum, our empirical analysis provides empirical evidence that the Canadian equalization
system influences recipient provinces tax policy incentives. These incentive effects seem to
work mainly through the equalization-base effect. The results also show that virtual grants have
statistically significant negative effects on tax rates. The policy implication of this is that if the
current equalization grants are substituted with block grants that are not related to the fiscal
capacity of the provinces, provincial tax rates will be lower.
EQUALIZATION GRANTS AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
Empirical specification and methodology
We now examine the effects of equalization grants on the level and composition of provincial
expenditures. In the previous section, we have seen that equalization grants provide receiving
provinces an incentive to raise their tax rates, which in turn, affects their tax base and the
amount of equalization-grant entitlements. Provincial expenditures may also have the power to
influence the tax bases of provinces, which in turn affects their equalization grants. In fact,
theoretical studies, such as Dahlby,57 and Cyrenne and Pandey,58 show that equalization grants
can affect both the level and the composition of government expenditure. Equalization grants
may influence provincial governments to spend less on tax-base-enhancing expenditures and
more on consumptive expenditures. Thus, the composition of provincial expenditure can be
57 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects.”
58 Cyrenne and Pandey, “Fiscal equalization.”
20
influenced by equalization grants. The literature on the flypaper effects also show that lump-
sum grants, such as equalization grants, can stimulate receiving jurisdictions’ expenditure. See
Gamkhar and Shah59 and the references contained therein. Thus, equalization grants can
influence both the level and composition of provincial spending.
In order to analyze the effect of equalization grants on the level and composition of provincial
spending, we use the following basic specification:
Ep,t = β0 +β1 Gp,t + β2 X + up,t (8)
where Ep,t is the real per capita total (or category of) government expenditure in province p in
year t, Gp,t is real per capita equalization grants, and X contains all other relevant control
variables. Note that, due to the variation in local government expenditure responsibilities and
the corresponding differences in provincial governments’ own expenditures, we have used
consolidated provincial and local spending as the dependent variable in our regression models.
Empirical specifications similar to Equation (8) are quite commonly used in the literature. Our
empirical specification is very close to that of Shelton.60 Mauro61 also analyzed the impact of
corruption on the composition of government expenditure, however he used government
spending as a ratio of GDP as a dependent variable. Notice that our empirical methodology in
this section is different than what we employed in the previous section, as it is not feasible to
construct virtual grants for the total equalization grants and decompose the equalization-grant
effects into income and incentive effects. It is also important to note that we use actual
equalization grants rather than equalization entitlements associated with a specific tax category
as we did in the previous section. As a result of this, the empirical methodology employed in
this section is different than what we use in the tax policy incentive analysis.
In addition to the total provincial expenditure, we examine the effects of equalization grants on
12 provincial expenditure categories.62 These categories include government expenditure on:
health services (“Health”), education (“Education”), social services (“Social”), transportation
and communication (“TransComm”), resource conservation and industrial assistance
(“Resource”), protection of persons and property (“Protection”), general government services
(“Government services”), environment (“Environment”), recreation and culture (“Recreation”),
housing (“Housing”), regional planning and development (“Regional”), and labour, employment
and immigration (“Labour and immigration”). Cyrenne and Pandey63 also study the effect of
equalization grants on expenditure compositions by dividing expenditure into two broad
categories (i.e., productive or unproductive), rather than studying each individual category as we
do in this paper. Although such classification simplifies empirical analysis, it is clear that each
expenditure category may include both productive and unproductive spending elements.
59 Gamkhar and Shah, “The impact.”
60 C. A. Shelton, “The Size and composition of government expenditure,” Journal of Public Economics 91 (2007):
2230–2260.
61 P. Mauro, “Corruption and the composition of government expenditure,” Journal of Public Economics 69 (1998):
263–279.
62 While the expenditure categories are disaggregated, it is important to note that they are sufficiently broad so that
spending within a given category could include both tax-base-enhancing and consumption elements. This problem
also equally applies even to those studies that arbitrarily classify spending categories as productive or non-
productive.
63 Cyrenne and Pandey, “Fiscal equalization.”
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We focus on analyzing levels of per capita spending rather than shares of spending for various
reasons. First, in many policy debates, various commentators and analysts often compare
provinces on the basis of spending per capita rather than spending shares. So our analysis helps
shed light on how equalization grants affect the various spending categories on per capita basis.
Second and most importantly, in the flypaper literature, the debate on the stimulative effects of
lump-sum grants on subnational governments’ spending focuses on the response of per capita
expenditure to grants. See Dahlberg et al. and the references contained therein.64 Thus, we use
a similar approach to make our results comparable to the wider flypaper literature. 
In Equation (8), our main coefficient of interest is β1. Regarding the effects of grants on
government spending, the literature on flypaper effects suggest that lump-sum
intergovernmental grants, such as equalization grants, have a stimulative effect on government
spending. Thus we expect β1 > 0 in the total government expenditure equation. 
Theoretical studies on the incentive effects of equalization grants on government spending
suggest that equalization grants may give provincial governments the incentive to spend more
on consumptive spending and less on productive services that have the potential to increase
their tax bases. See Dahlby, and Cyrenne and Pandey.65 If this is indeed the case, we expect
equalization grants to affect provincial spending on such tax-base-enhancing services as
education, transportation and communication to be negative.
We include various economic, demographic and political co-variates as control variables. The
economic variables included in our regressions are per capita personal income as in Winer66 and
Gamkhar and Oates.67 We also control for the unemployment rate and non-equalization grants. 
The demographic makeup of a province can influence both the total amount and the type of
public services to be provided. Aging and young populations in particular necessitate various
social and health-care related spending by the government. To account for this, as in Dahlberg
et al.,68 we include the shares of the population that are 65 years and above and below 20 years
of age as control variables. We also include the share of the population comprised of new
immigrants to the province as an additional co-variate.
A government’s spending decision and the composition of government spending can often be
influenced by the political ideology of the governing party and presence of an election.69 As
discussed in Baker et al.,70 Kneebone and McKenzie,71 and others, left-leaning governments 
64 Dahlberg et al., “Using a discontinuous.”
65 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects”; Cyrenne and Pandey, “Fiscal equalization.”
66 Winer, “Some evidence.”
67 S. Gamkhar and W. Oates, “Asymmetries in the response to increases and decreases in intergovernmental grants:
some empirical findings,” National Tax Journal 49 (1996): 501–512.
68 Dahlberg et al., “Using a discontinuous.”
69 See: A. Brender and A. Drazen, “Elections, leaders, and the composition of government spending,” Journal of Public
Economics 97 (2013): 18–31.
70 M. Baker, A. Payne and M. Smart, “An empirical study of matching grants: ‘the cap on CAP,’” Journal of Public
Economics 72 (1999): 269–288.
71 R. Kneebone and K. McKenzie, “Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian
Provinces,” International Tax and Public Finance 8 (2001): 753–774.
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generally have a tendency to be pro-spending. Thus, we further expand our set of control
variables to capture this ideological effect on government spending. We include a dummy
variable (“Left”) that is equal to one if the premier of the province belongs to the Liberal party
or the New Democratic Party (NDP). We also include an election dummy variable that is equal
to one in the years in which there is an election. 
As discussed previously, the allocation of equalization grants is based on a formula that
compares the per capita fiscal capacity of the province and that of the standard provinces.
While provinces with fiscal capacities below the standard fiscal capacity receive equalization
grants, those provinces with fiscal capacities above the standard do not receive grants. Since
the fiscal capacity of the province determines the revenue-generation capacity of the province,
it can have a direct effect on government spending. This shows that the equalization grants are
endogenous. A number of previous studies also argue that empirical analysis of the effects of
grants on government spending should consider grants as endogenous.72 Thus, the basic
government expenditure specification of Equation (8) cannot be estimated consistently using
ordinary least squares since our key variable of interest, equalization grants, is endogenous.
Instead, as in previous similar studies, we rely on the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation
method for our empirical analysis. We discuss below the choice of instruments and our main
identification strategy.
In order to analyze the effect of equalization grants on the level and composition of provincial
spending, we focus on total equalization grants rather than equalization entitlements related to
a particular revenue category as we did in the previous section. The total equalization grant to
be provided for a province is determined by adding all the equalization-grant entitlements from
the various revenue categories. Using Equation (2a) of the previous section, for all different tax
revenue categories, the total per capita equalization-grant entitlement for a province is
calculated using the following formula:
Gp  = ∑j=1 gpj  = ∑j=1 τj (Bj – Bpj). (9)
If the total entitlement for all revenue categories, as shown in Equation (9), is positive, then the
province is categorized as a receiving province and receives per capita equalization grants Gp.
Thus, provinces with a below-average measure of fiscal capacity receive equalization grants to
bring them up to the national average. However, if the difference from the formula in Equation
(9) is negative, it means that the province has a fiscal capacity better than the national average
and is not entitled to receive equalization payments. 
Note that Equation (9) shows that there is a discontinuity in the equalization-grant allocation
formula. As the equalization-grant formula shows a discontinuity in the relationship between
grants and fiscal capacity, we rely on this discontinuity to identify the effects of equalization
grants on government spending. Thus, as in Dahlberg et al.,73 we use the equalization-grant 
72 See, for instance: Knight, “Endogenous federal”; Dahlberg et al., “Using a discontinuous”; and L. Brooks, J. Phillips
and M. Sinitsyn, “The cabals of a few or the confusion of a multitude: the institutional trade-off between
representation and governance,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3 (2011): 1–24.
73 Dahlberg et al., “Using a discontinuous.”
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n n
formula, denoted as “Formula,” as the excluded instrument for grants.74 Angrist and Lavy75
also use the class-size allocation formula as an instrument for class size conditional on a
smooth function of enrollment. Since the fiscal capacity of the province can have a direct effect
on government spending, we need to control for this element of the equalization-grant formula.
We use a smooth polynomial function of fiscal capacity. Our basic identifying assumption is
that any other effect of the formula on government expenditure is controlled by the smooth
function of fiscal capacity of the province. 
Data
The dataset for our empirical analysis come from various sources. Annual provincial and local
government expenditures, personal income, prices, population and the number of new
immigrants come from Statistics Canada database (CANSIM). The data source for all other
variables are as indicated before. Table 1b presents the summary statistics for the various
variables used in the government-expenditure regressions.
TABLE 1B: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN GOVERNMENT-EXPENDITURE REGRESSIONS, 1981-2008
Note: All monetary values are per capita in 2002 Canadian dollars. For all variables the number of observations is 
280. Government expenditure data are consolidated provincial and local (in fiscal year). 
a See also Table 1a for other control variables
b Fiscal capacity is measured by the tax yield of provinces as in the equalization-grant allocation formula used by 
the federal government. This is simply the sum of the various provincial tax bases evaluated at their respective 
national average tax rates.
74 The instrument is defined as:  Formula  = 
where the variables are as defined before.
75 J. D. Angrist and V. Lavy, “Using Maimonides’ rule to estimates the effect of class size on scholastic achievement,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999): 533–575.
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Government Expenditure and Its Components
Total expenditure 8,601 1,320 5,619 12,191
Health services 2,083 521 1,122 3,725
Education 1,911 377 1,189 5,061
Social services 1,077 383 553 2,793
Transportation and communications 627 146 360 1,339
Resource conservation and industrial assistance 472 306 108 1,945
Protection of persons and property 427 93 193 671
General government services 311 106 125 770
Environment 239 76 68 439
Recreation and culture 221 71 92 406
Housing 76 44 0 207
Regional planning and development 53 23 0 207
Labour, employment and immigration 27 21 0 107
Other Variables a
Equalization grants 819 715 0 2,395
Tax yield of provinces b 4,576 1,927 1,320 12,839
Personal income 23,878 3,981 14,282 33,879
Other grants 710 128 354 931
Population share of new immigrants (in %) 0.41 0.33 0.05 1.37
Variables Mean  Standard Min. Max.
Deviation
∑   τj Bj
–1
n
j=1
∑   τj Bpjnj=1(   )      
Empirical results and discussions
We begin the discussion of our empirical results by presenting the first-stage results in Table 5.
Columns (1) to (4) show the regression results associated with various non-linear specifications
of relative fiscal capacity. We can check the relevance of the excluded instrument, Formula, by
looking at the t-value of the instrument. The results suggest that the instrument for equalization
grant is positive and statistically significant in all cases. Various statistical tests also confirm
the relevance of our excluded instrument. More specifically, our empirical model is not under-
identified as the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected at the five per cent
significance level for all regressions. Furthermore, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for weak-
instruments bias indicates that the results are not affected by the presence of weak instruments.
Thus, we conclude that our instrument for equalization grants is statistically valid.
TABLE 5: FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS, 1981-2008
Notes: Dependent variable is real per capita equalization grant.
We now discuss the effects of equalization grants on total provincial expenditure and its
various components. As discussed before, we focus on both total provincial expenditure and on
the 12 provincial expenditure categories. We present these results in Table 6 below. As
indicated, the dependent variables are total provincial expenditure and its various categories all
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Income 0.0744 *** 0.0647 *** 0.0628 *** 0.0650 ***
(0.0257) (0.0230) (0.0237) (0.0233)
Old -166.3 *** -91.44 ** -105.0 *** -100.7 ***
(42.04) (37.66) (38.65) (38.09)
Young -57.79 *** -26.11 * -28.60 * -27.98 *
(15.53) (14.35) (15.65) (14.84)
Left 21.41 21.69 35.68 * 27.19
(20.94) (19.15) (20.76) (19.71)
Election 1.589 -2.848 -1.647 -2.413
(19.15) (15.26) (16.62) (15.74)
Unemployment 17.22 * 11.16 17.26 * 13.88
(9.896) (9.169) (9.817) (9.432)
New immigrants 85.00 187.7 *** 184.4 *** 178.1 ***
(60.11) (64.40) (67.09) (64.76)
Other grants -0.523 * -0.244 -0.356 * -0.271
(0.270) (0.200) (0.210) (0.203)
Constant -1,058.4 -5,245.5 *** -945.4 3,916.4 ***
(1,017.8) (1,161.8) (752.5) (1,210.7)
Instrument
Formula 3,658.8 *** 4,387.1 *** 3,734.7 *** 4,151.6 ***
(678.1) (648.7) (647.9) (655.1)
Provincial effects yes yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes yes
Fiscal capacity cubic quartic quadratic- cubic-
spline spline
Under-identification test 24.86 *** 28.27 *** 25.40 *** 27.13 ***
Weak-identification test 29.12 45.74 33.23 40.16
Number of observations 280 280 280 280
AIC 3,584.2 3,518.8 3,550.3 3,533.0
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
measured in real per capita terms. All regressions include provincial and year-specific fixed-
effects and other exogenous co-variates. The control exogenous variables included are:
personal income per capita, unemployment rate, real per capita non-equalization grants, a
dummy variable for left-leaning government, a dummy variable for the presence of an election
in the current year, and shares of the population that are new immigrants, below 20 years of
age, and 65 years old and above. We report and focus our discussion on the coefficient
estimates of the key variable of interest. The other variables are included in the estimation but
suppressed for the sake of brevity.76 In addition to the control variables, we include various
non-linear specifications for fiscal capacity as indicated. We also report standard errors which
are robust to heteroskedasticity.
TABLE 6: EFFECTS OF EQUALIZATION GRANTS ON THE LEVEL AND COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 
1981-2008
Notes: The dependent variables are real per capita government expenditures as indicated. The number of
observations is 280. Each coefficient estimate is obtained from a separate regression. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** for one per cent, ** for five per cent, and * for 10 per
cent. All regressions include provincial- and year-specific fixed-effects and other exogenous co-variates. The
control exogenous variables included are: personal income per capita, unemployment rate, real per capita non-
equalization grants, a dummy variable for left-leaning government, a dummy variable for the presence of an
election in the current year, shares of the population comprised of new immigrants, below 20 years of age, and
65 years  old and above. In columns (2) to (5), equalization grant is instrumented with the equalization-grant
allocation formula after controlling for fiscal capacity as indicated. 
76 The detailed regression results for the total expenditure and its various categories are available upon request.
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Total government expenditure 0.827 *** 0.823 ** 0.637 ** 0.672 * 0.687 **
(0.177) (0.370) (0.317) (0.348) (0.328)
Health 0.122 ** 0.292 *** 0.207 *** 0.262 *** 0.238 ***
(0.0580) (0.0956) (0.0730) (0.0862) (0.0785)
Education 0.0603 -0.00658 -0.0704 -0.0289 -0.0488
(0.0663) (0.255) (0.246) (0.251) (0.247)
Social 0.00933 -0.187 ** -0.145 * -0.217 ** -0.161 *
(0.0531) (0.0937) (0.0845) (0.0950) (0.0871)
Transport and Communication 0.0410 0.0298 0.0243 0.0214 0.0251
(0.0302) (0.0500) (0.0460) (0.0492) (0.0469)
Resources 0.278 *** 0.394 *** 0.354 *** 0.359 ** 0.364 ***
(0.0781) (0.147) (0.126) (0.142) (0.131)
Protection -0.0310 *** -0.000196 -0.0255 * -0.0131 -0.0189
(0.0109) (0.0202) (0.0141) (0.0167) (0.0151)
Government Services -0.00525 -0.0309 -0.0192 -0.0301 -0.0234
(0.0199) (0.0323) (0.0281) (0.0316) (0.0291)
Environment 0.0495 *** 0.0684 *** 0.0509 ** 0.0657 *** 0.0569 ***
(0.0146) (0.0246) (0.0207) (0.0236) (0.0216)
Recreation 0.0320 *** 0.0149 0.0241 0.0173 0.0212
(0.0111) (0.0202) (0.0174) (0.0196) (0.0182)
Housing 0.0209 ** 0.0739 *** 0.0583 *** 0.0627 ** 0.0599 ***
(0.00936) (0.0256) (0.0219) (0.0243) (0.0227)
Regional -0.00334 -0.000756 0.00143 -0.000261 0.000913
(0.00668) (0.00892) (0.00814) (0.00873) (0.00831)
Labour and Immigration -0.00430 -0.0149 * -0.0116 -0.0150 * -0.0128
(0.00408) (0.00881) (0.00774) (0.00849) (0.00796)
Fiscal Capacity cubic quartic quadratic- cubic-
spline spline
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
In column (1), we represent results obtained using the OLS estimation method. Note that each
coefficient estimate in Table 5 is obtained from a separate regression with the various
dependent variables as shown. The OLS results show that equalization grants have a
statistically significant positive effect on total provincial government spending. The results
indicate that a $1.00 increase in per capita equalization grants is associated with a $0.83
increase in per capita total provincial government spending. This result is broadly consistent
with the findings of previous related studies.
The OLS results of column (1) also show that equalization grants have statistically significant
positive effects on real per capita provincial spending on health-care services (Health),
resource conservation and industrial assistance (Resource), environment, recreation and culture,
and housing. The results also show that equalization grants have a statistically significant effect
on government spending on protection of persons and property. However, we do not find a
significant effect on the other expenditure categories. The insignificant effects of equalization
grants on tax-base-enhancing expenditures, such as education and transport and communication,
is not surprising and somewhat consistent with the predictions of theoretical studies such as
Dahlby.77
So far, we have focused on OLS estimation results assuming that equalization grants are
exogenous. However, as we have argued before, the OLS estimation results may be biased as
the equalization grant is endogenous. Consequently, we present the IV estimation results in
columns (2) through (5) of Table 6. We use the equalization-grant formula as our main
identification strategy after controlling for a non-linear function of relative fiscal capacity as
indicated. The specifications of columns (2) to (5) are basically similar and they differ only in
the non-linear functional form of fiscal capacity. Based on adjusted R-squared, the regressions
with quartic specification for fiscal capacity show the best fit for the data.78 So, we focus our
discussion on results presented in column (3), which control for a quartic form of fiscal
capacity.
Column (3) presents the IV estimation results that control for a quartic function of fiscal
capacity. The results indicate that equalization grant has a positive and statistically significant
effect on per capita provincial expenditure. The numerical magnitude of the result is lower than
what we found under OLS, suggesting the potential bias of OLS results. The results suggest
that a $1.00 increase in per capita equalization grants is associated with about a $0.64 increase
in real per capita provincial expenditure. This also implicitly suggests that the remaining effect
of the equalization grants is to help reduce the tax rates that otherwise would have been higher
than in the presence of the equalization program. Thus, the results are consistent with the
proposition that equalization grants have stimulative effects on provincial spending. As before,
we report and focus our discussion on the coefficient estimates of the key variables of interest.
The other variables are included in the estimation but not reported for the sake of brevity. In
addition to the control variables, we include various non-linear specifications for fiscal
capacity. 
77 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects.”
78 The corresponding adjusted R-square statistics for each coefficient estimate are not reported for the sake of brevity.
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Comparing results of columns (1) and (3), we see that the numerical magnitudes of the effects
of equalization grants on the various components of provincial spending are slightly higher
when we use the IV estimations. Empirical results reported in column (3) show that
equalization grants have statistically significant positive effects on real per capita provincial
spending on health-care services (Health), resource conservation and industrial assistance
(Resource), environment, and housing. The results indicate that a $1.00 increase in per capita
equalization grants is associated with a $0.21 increase in per capita provincial expenditure on
health-care services, a $0.35 increase in per capita provincial expenditure on resource
conservation and industrial assistance, a $0.05 increase in per capita spending on the
environment, and a $0.058 increase in spending on housing.
The results also show that equalization grants have a weak negative effect on government
spending on social services and protection of persons and property. These coefficients are
significant only at the 10 per cent level. However, we do not find a significant effect of
equalization grants on the other expenditure categories. The insignificant effects of equalization
grants on tax-base-enhancing expenditures, such as education and transport and communication,
is consistent with the predictions of theoretical studies such as Dahlby.79 
CONCLUSIONS 
The fiscal equalization program has long helped to underpin the Canadian federation. As the
program was designed to address fiscal disparities among provinces, the grant allocation
formula compensates recipient provinces when their per capita tax base is below the standard
per capita tax base. Thus, the key elements of the equalization formula can be influenced by
the fiscal decisions of the provincial government. This provides recipient governments the
incentive to change their fiscal policies in order to raise their equalization entitlements. In this
paper, we investigate how the Canadian equalization system influences the recipient provinces’
fiscal policy incentives. We provide empirical evidence on the effects of equalization grants on
tax policy and the level and composition of provincial expenditure using Canadian provincial
data over the period 1981-2008.
We first conduct an empirical investigation of the incentive effects of equalization grants on
business and personal income taxes, which are arguably the two largest sources of provincial tax
revenue in Canada. Our empirical results suggest that equalization grants provide provincial
governments an incentive to raise their business and personal income tax rates. We also find that
this incentive effect works through the equalization-base effect for business income tax. For
personal income tax, on the other hand, the results indicate that equalization grants influence the
tax policy incentives through both the equalization-base and -rate effects, although the latter
seems to be driven by Quebec. The incentive effects of equalization grants clearly cause
distortion in provincial tax policy, as the recipient governments underestimate the true
deadweight cost associated with the higher tax rates. Indeed, the empirical results suggest that if
equalization grants were substituted with block grants that are not related to taxing capacity,
business and personal income tax rates would be lower in the grant-receiving provinces.
79 Dahlby, “The Incentive Effects.”
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Our empirical results also suggest that equalization grants stimulate provincial spending and
affect the various provincial expenditure categories. Results from our preferred regression
indicates that a $1.00 increase in per capita equalization-grant raises per capita total provincial
expenditure by about $0.64. This is broadly consistent with the flypaper literature and the
estimated results are well within the ranges of results obtained in other similar studies.
Empirical estimates of the effects of equalization grants on the composition of provincial
spending also reveal that not all provincial spending categories are affected by equalization
grants. We find that equalization grants have a significant positive effect on provincial
spending on health-care services, resource conservation and industrial assistance, environment,
and housing. However, we do not find a significant effect on the other expenditure categories.
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http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/beaulieau-foreign-inv.pdf
Eugene Beaulieu and Matthew Saunders | June 2014
FROM TRIAL TO TRIUMPH: HOW CANADA’S PAST FINANCIAL CRISES HELPED SHAPE A SUPERIOR REGULATORY SYSTEM
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/savage-financeevol.pdf
Lawrie Savage | May 2014
THE FREE RIDE IS OVER: WHY CITIES, AND CITIZENS, MUST START PAYING FOR MUCH-NEEDED INFRASTRUCTURE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/bazelmintz-urban-growth.pdf
Philip Bazel and Jack Mintz | May 2014
ALBERTA CITIES AT THE CROSSROADS: URBAN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/taylor-ab-cities-5.pdf
Anna Kramer, Marcy Burchfield and Zack Taylor | May 2014
ONTARIO’S EXPERIMENT WITH PRIMARY CARE REFORM
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/ontario-health-care-reform.pdf
Gioia Buckley and Arthur Sweetman | May 2014
THE MIDDLE POWER AND THE MIDDLE KINGDOM: SECURING CANADA’S PLACE IN THE NEW CHINA-U.S. ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC WORLD ORDER
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/dobson-china-communique.pdf
Wendy Dobson | April 2014
SAFETY IN NUMBERS: EVALUATING CANADIAN RAIL SAFETY DATA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/winter-rail-safety-communique.pdf
Jennifer Winter | April 2014
CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND CANADA’S FDI POLICY
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/dobson-china.pdf
Wendy Dobson | March 2014
